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REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is obvious that regulatory structures and institutions play a key role in the environment 
necessary to promote enterprise. In its document DFID Enterprise Development Strategy 
(EDD, 2000), the Enterprise Development Department refers to the need for “competent legal 
and regulatory institutions … and sensible regulation on health and safety, business 
registration and trade licensing” (para 3.6.2.), contrasting that with “a heritage of heavy state 
intervention, unfavourable government policy, outdated law and excessive regulation [which] 
still persists, factors that heavily constrain enterprise” (para 3.6.4). 
 
What are the main characteristics of a “good” or “sensible” regulatory system? The answer to 
the question has two dimensions. The first relates to the instruments or legal forms selected 
to achieve the desired objectives. These should be appropriate in the light of the economic 
and social justifications for intervention and of their predicted impact on the regulated 
community. The second relates to the procedures or processes by which the instruments are 
formulated and applied. Clearly a regulatory regime cannot succeed unless its operation has 
legitimacy within the community it serves. To this end, certain process values must be 
recognised, including those of expertise, transparency, and accountability. 
 
In this paper, drawing on the familiar legal, and legal-policy literature,
1 I seek to summarise 
the main ideas relating to the two dimensions described above and thereby to derive research 
issues applicable to developing economies. My methodology is derived from what may be 
described as the sub-discipline of law-and-economics. In relation to regulation, the movement 
has generated two forms of analysis. 
 
Public interest analysis makes a major input to the instrument dimension. It involves a three-
stage inquiry: identifying and explaining instances of market failure; investigating alternative 
methods of correcting the failure; and predicting the response of actors to the different methods, 
                                                 
1 Notably: Breyer, 1982; Sunstein, 1990; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Ogus, 1994; Baldwin, 1995a; Prosser, 
1997, Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Baldwin and Cave, 1999   3
with a focus on the minimisation of administrative costs, particularly information and 
enforcement costs. 
 
In sharp contrast, private interest analysis, developed from the Virginia School of “public 
choice”, seeks to explain how regulatory principles and structures may diverge from what is 
desirable in terms of the public interest, because politicians and bureaucrats may be motivated to 
meet the demands of private interest groups who seek the advantages which regulation cast in a 
particular form may confer on them. This clearly has major implications for the procedural 
dimension of “good” regulation, because it becomes necessary to explore what constitutional 
and procedural arrangements can best constrain behaviour of this kind. 
 
REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS AND FORMS 
The choice of an appropriate regulatory instrument must, in the first instance, depend on the 
justification for the intervention. Once the justification, or justifications, has/have been 
identified, the policy-maker is then faced with a choice between different instruments, each 
with its own set of advantages and disadvantages. Although other modes of reasoning are not 
to be excluded, the question then typically becomes one of selecting the instrument which can 
meet the regulatory objective at lowest cost. 
 
(1) Justifications for Intervention 
Logically regulation should only exist where the unregulated market will fail to reach the 
desired outcomes. But historically, government have perhaps been too ready to embark on 
regulation without first ascertaining whether the intervention is really necessary. In 
consequence it is often difficult to identify the exact reasoning which motivated the 
intervention. Nevertheless, on the basis of the standard literature, we can attempt a non-
exhaustive list of the justifications most often cited. These may be conveniently divided into 
economic and non-economic. 
 
The main economic instances of market-failure are: 
 
•   Monopolies or a significant impediments to a competitive market 
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•   Inadequate or asymmetrical information affecting the relationship between suppliers 
and consumers 
 
•   Externalities (spillover effects) whereby activities affect third parties in ways not 
reflected in the prices set by producers 
 
•   Co-ordination problems: though desired outcomes can in principle be achieved by 
private transactions, the costs of co-ordination are so high that it is cheaper for the law to 
prescribe conduct. 
 
Among the most important non-economic justifications are: 
 
•   Distributional justice: the unregulated market leads to outcomes which do not accord 
with what is a perceived just distribution of resources 
 
•   Paternalism: individuals are (in relation to the particular area of intervention) assumed 
not to be the good judges of, or are not trusted to act in accordance with, what is in their 
own best interest. 
 
(2) Inadequacies of Private Law Remedies 
It is not always appreciated that in relation to most of the phenomena described above as 
justifying regulation private law remedies exist, capable in principle of solving the problem. 
So, for example, private property rights are used to internalise externalities and contracts are 
sometimes not enforceable where they are used in situations of information asymmetry. 
Arguably, such private solution should take priority because they allow those adversely 
affected to have their grievances addressed directly, without the heavy hand of state 
intervention. If that is right, those arguing for (public law) regulation should be able to 
demonstrate a failure of private law to solve the given problem. 
 
In many situations, it will not be difficult to show private law failure. The chief problem 
afflicting private law is that of transaction costs. Rationally, individuals and firms will only seek 
to enforce rights where the expected benefits exceed the expected costs, which include not only 
legal expenses but also time and trouble. Given the general principle that compensation for the   5
infringement of private rights should not exceed the losses sustained by the plaintiff, many 
legitimate claims are for this reason not pursued. Thus externalities which affect large numbers 
but which impose only a small loss on each individual right-holder will not be internalised by 
private law instruments and serious misallocations will remain uncorrected. The inhibitory 
impact of the costs of private enforcement is exacerbated in cases where it is difficult to acquire 
the information necessary to pursue a successful claim, particularly where high technology is 
involved and where complex causation questions arise. 
 
(3) Regulatory Instruments: Social Regulation 
There is a wide variety of regulatory instruments and no consensus on how they should be 
classified (Mitnick, 1980). Nevertheless, it may be helpful to consider separately the main 
forms used in two different areas of regulation: social regulation which deals with such 
matters as health and safety, environmental protection and consumer protection and tends to be 
justified by reference to externalities and asymmetric information; and economic regulation 




A commercial or industrial activity pollutes the environment or generates hazards for health and 
safety; a professional activity – say that involving the giving of legal or investment advice – 
involves the risk of financial losses. How can these activities be controlled? 
 
Note, first, that the regulatory aim should not be to eliminate loss; rather it should be that of 
achieving an optimal degree of loss abatement, the point where the marginal benefits of reducing 
the loss are equivalent to the marginal costs, the latter reflecting the administrative and other 
costs associated with the regulatory regimes, as well as the compliance costs of the regulated 





                                                 
2 The arguments assume that the instruments are applied individually. For consideration of combination of 
instruments, see Gunningham and Grabovsky, 1998, 422-453.   6
(a) Prior Approval 
This regulatory form requires that firms, before lawfully engaging in an activity or supplying a 
product or service, must first obtain a licence or permit from an authorising agency; and for such 
approval they have to satisfy the agency that certain conditions of quality are, or are capable of 
being, meeting the requirement of optimal loss abatement 
 
The administrative costs of scrutinising all applications is very high and to these must be added 
the opportunity costs arising from any delay before the licence is granted. Moreover, significant 
welfare losses arise if the system is used for the anti-competitive purpose of creating barriers to 
entry (Moore, 1961). The benefit from prior scrutiny must therefore be very large to justify, on 
public interest grounds, these substantial costs. 
 
Two sets of circumstances in which such large benefits are likely to arise may be identified 
(Shavell, 1993). The first comprises cases (e.g. nuclear accidents) where the consequences of 
performance failure may be so catastrophic, or the social aversion to them so high, that prior 
scrutiny and prevention is perceived to be preferable to deterrence from the threat of ex-post 
sanctions. In sharp contrast, the second category does not necessarily give rise to large losses in 
individual cases. The problem, which is particularly acute in relation to the provision of services, 
is rather that of expressing or measuring a variety of characteristics of performance in a 
sufficiently succinct and yet comprehensive manner that they can be formulated as enforceable 
standards. The assessment of a multitude of factors is facilitated by the case-by-case approach 
adopted in the licensing process. 
 
(b) Mandatory Standards 
The standards technique allows the activity to take place without any ex ante control but the 
supplier who fails to meet certain standards of quality commits an offence. Standards can be 
subdivided into: performance (or output) standards requiring certain conditions of quality to be 
met at the point of supply, but leaves the supplier free to choose how to meet those conditions 
and specification (or input) standards compelling the supplier to employ certain production 
methods or materials; or prohibiting the use of certain production methods of materials. 
 
The most important economic variables in choosing between these types of standards are the 
costs of being informed on the technological means of achieving the regulatory goals and the 
administrative costs of formulating appropriate standards and monitoring compliance (Stewart,   7
1981). In principle, firms should be given choice as to how to meet the goals, since that 
encourages innovation in loss abatement techniques. Hence, there is a presumption in favour of 
less interventionist measures. However, the benefits of such measures might be outweighed by 
the costs of administering them and/or the costs to firms of acquiring information on loss 
abatement technology. 
 
The principal advantages of specification standards relate to administrative costs. It is easier for 
the standard-setter to predict compliance costs, since these vary little from one firm to another. 
As regards monitoring, the enforcement agency has simply to verify that the prescribed input has 
been used by firms, or, in the case of a negative standard, that a prohibited substance or process 
has not been used. The firms, themselves, do not face uncertainty as regards either the law or the 
action necessary to achieve particular outcomes. 
 
There are, on the other hand, significant disadvantages to specification standards. The fact that 
the standard is imposed at an earlier stage in the production process implies that the standard-
setter has a (perhaps inappropriately) high level of confidence that the mandatory inputs will 
accomplish the regulatory goal in a cost-effective manner. The prohibition of other inputs 
induces technological rigidity, since it inhibits firms from innovating in general and from 
developing other, and cheaper, means of meeting regulatory targets in particular. Specification 
standards become obsolete very rapidly and there is typically a delay before technological 
changes are reflected in the regulations. These consequences may give rise to major social 
welfare losses. 
 
It follows that the case for specification standards is weak unless the standard-setter has better 
access than firms to information concerning the technology of production and unwanted effects, 
or firms (or their products) are sufficiently homogeneous that innovative activity is unlikely to 
occur or to generate significant social benefits. 
 
Standards (whether performance or specification) may be either uniform or differentiated 
according to region, industry or firm. Uniform standards are very much cheaper to formulate and 
enforce and they are less susceptible to being manipulated to protect private interests. But if the 
public interest goal is to minimise the sum of the costs arising from a given activity and of the 
costs of modifying that activity to reduce the harm, both sets of cost may vary according to the 
circumstances of the firm, its location, or the population affected by the activity. Formulating   8
standards on the basis of "average" costs will then inevitably lead to some mismatches and 
welfare losses. Standards should then be differentiated where the benefits of reducing these 
losses exceed the additional administrative costs of formulation and enforcement (Latin, 1985). 
 
(c) Information Disclosure 
Rather than impose standards on suppliers, forcing them to adopt optimal loss abatement, 
legislation may simply require that they disclose to purchasers and others information regarding 
harms or risks which may arise from the activity or product. 
 
Individuals do not have homogeneous preferences regarding quality and safety: some prefer a 
package of higher quality/safety at a higher price; others lower quality/safety at a lower price. If 
regulation forces suppliers to reveal adequate information as to quality/safety, on the basis of 
which consumers can exercise choice, market transactions will ensure that preferences are met; 
and there will be no welfare losses from consumers being deprived of choice, as can occur under 
a standards regime (Schwartz and Wilde, 1979). Moreover, mandatory disclosure will reduce 
costs where the consumer is the least cost-abater, notably by responding to published warnings. 
The administrative costs of formulating and enforcing disclosure rules are also relatively low, 
given in particular that policy-makers do not themselves have to determine optimal levels of loss 
abatement. 
 
On the other hand the potential application of this technique is limited since not all those 
affected by the product or activity will receive the information and be able thereby to adapt their 
behaviour or enter into appropriate transactions. Moreover, even within the narrower group of 
purchasers who can use the information there may be problems. It may be impossible to 
summarise the necessary information in a form which the great majority will read and 
understand. The "bounded rationality" of individuals may constitute a further obstacle: there is 
evidence that individuals tend to overestimate risks associated with low-probability events and 
underestimate those arising from higher-probability events. Given the often significant costs to 
purchasers of assimilating information and making decisions, it may be cheaper to force 
suppliers to adjust the product or service to what purchasers would presumptively have chosen if 
those intellectual processes had been completed. This solution may be particularly apposite 
where the costs arising from consumer error are high, for example where death or serious 
personal injury may result. 
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(d) Economic Instruments 
As an alternative to compelling optimal loss abatement by the threat of a sanction (often called 
"command-and-control" regulation) governments can attempt to achieve the same ends by 
economic incentives. The most important form of such incentive is a tax or charge: conduct is 




To correct misallocations arising from externalities, the amount set should be equal to the 
marginal damage which the individual or firm inflicts on others. Because the external cost of the 
activity is thereby borne by the actor, this should, if the activity takes place within a competitive 
market, ensure an allocatively efficient level of production and consumption (Baumol, 1972). 
 
An important advantage claimed for taxes is that, provided the agency can make a reasonable 
estimate of the damage costs, it need have no knowledge of the abatement costs. Once a tax has 
been set to reflect the damage costs, it is left to individual firms to decide whether it is cheaper to 
pay the tax or else to abate. Further, the system provides better information for firms on the costs 
they will incur from the legal intervention: the tax represents a certain sum, whereas what they 
will have to pay if they contravene a standard depends on such uncertain variables as the 
enforcement discretion of the agency and the sentencing discretion of the court. Finally, since, 
under a tax system, the cost to a firm increases in line with the amount of damage, there is an 
incentive for the firm to reduce the latter as much as possible. In this respect, it would appear 
that taxes are superior to command-and-control regulation: although a firm will seek to find the 
cheapest way of meeting a standard, once that standard has been achieved it has no incentive 
further to reduce the damage. 
 
These are powerful arguments but some qualification needs to be made (Ogus, 1998). Without 
information on abatement costs, an agency will be unable to predict how much damage will 
actually result from a given set of prices and thus how effective those prices will be in relation to 
the efficiency goal. To overcome this difficulty, the agency will in practice have to adopt an 
iterative or "trial and error" approach: an initial set of prices is established but these are 
subsequently modified as their impact is observed and as account is also taken of other variables. 
                                                 
3 Subsidies and tradeable emission rights are other economic instruments sometimes used.   10
 
(4) Regulatory Instruments: Economic Regulation 
As indicated above, economic regulation applies to markets which are insufficiently 
competitive. Two different, but sometimes complementary, approaches must be considered 
here. Although not generally considered to be “regulation”, competition law is the primary 
instrument for proscribing anti-competitive practices and thereby preserving or enhancing the 
competitiveness of markets. Where, however, it is deemed appropriate – generally because 
the conditions for a “natural monopoly” apply – for there to be a single supplier, legal 
measures must be introduced to control the price and quality of products and services. The 
discussion is divided accordingly. 
 
(a) Role of Competition Law 
It is beyond the scope of the paper to provide anything more than a glimpse of this important 
and complex area of law.
4 Suffice it to mention that institutions and principles are developed 
to identify and control the related phenomena of dominance in the market and its abuse and 
collusion between, or the merger of, competitors. As reflected in national and transnational 
legal regimes, opinions differ on the appropriate thresholds for defining unlawful conduct and 
the burden of proof. For example, one tradition regards it as sufficient that a single entity has 
a certain share of the market, while another focuses more on ascertaining the adverse welfare 
effects. 
 
Competition is not, in all circumstances, the panacea for economic welfare. In some 
circumstances it is advantageous for production to be undertaken by one firm, rather than by 
several or many. The classic instance is where the marginal costs - and hence also average costs 
- of a single firm's production continue in the long run to decline, typically because fixed costs 
are high relative to demand (Foster, 1992). Although the standard undesirable consequences of 
such a “natural” monopoly may persist (goods being overpriced and underproduced relative to 
their true social value; productive inefficiency), the remedy lies not in competition. Rather the 
monopoly is allowed to prevail and some form of regulation is necessary to control those 
consequences. In the following sections, I consider the various alternatives.
                                                 
4 For a survey, see e.g. Furse, 1999.   11
 
(b) Public Ownership 
In Europe, at least until recently, the most widely used regulatory form to control natural 
monopoly power has been public ownership. The expectation has been that the combination of 
political control and accountability, administrative diktat, and legal framework can best meet the 
regulatory goals. 
 
Conventional industrial organisation theory can be used to predict that public corporations will 
have difficulty in achieving the same levels of efficiency as private corporations (Prichard and 
Trebilcock, 1987). There are no shareholders (residual owners) who are financially interested in 
the profitability of the public firm other than general taxpayers. Now, while taxpayers may voice 
their disapproval in the political arena, the losses are spread very thinly among them: as 
individuals they will therefore have little incentive to spend resources on political or legal action. 
Further, in the absence of profit-making incentives, the motivation of the managers of public 
corporations to meet consumer demand may be dulled. It is often assumed that public ownership 
is the appropriate regulatory form to accomplish objectives which are not economic. For 
example, on distributional grounds, it may be policy to provide some services to some sections 
of the population at lower than cost prices. But there is no reason why, under a suitably 
formulated statutory framework, these same obligations may not be imposed on private 
organisations. 
 
Clearly if public ownership is the adopted form, attention must be given to the legal framework 
which is most likely to ensure that the public corporation performs satisfactorily its given 
role(Prichard and Trebilcock, 1987). The key components would seem to be: explicit legislative 
statements on objectives, powers and duties; clarification of the role (if any) of ministers in 
influencing the corporation’s policy; systems of budgetary control exercised through 
independent public audit institutions; and accountability by means of residual powers of judicial 
review. 
 
(c) Price and Quality Regulation 
If the supplying monopolist firm is transferred into private ownership, there is a need to control 
the prices and quality set by the firm. The regulatory system can be envisaged as a long-term 
contract between the regulatory agency and the monopolistic firm with the latter agreeing to 
meet the reasonable demands of consumers at minimum cost in return for the agency allowing it   12
to charge prices sufficient to cover those costs. The primary aim is then for the terms of this 
"contract" to mirror what would have occurred in an unregulated competitive market. 
 
The regulatory agency's task is a formidable one
5. Difficulties arise from the fact that its access 
to information concerning the firm's activities is limited. It will not always be well placed to 
make decisions on whether the costs incurred by the firm were reasonable and thus to be 
covered by the prices set. Another difficulty is to determine a rate of return for the firm sufficient 
for it to be able to attract investors. Moreover, if the agency succeeds in setting prices just 
sufficient to cover costs, this will eliminate the incentive which firms in unregulated competitive 
markets have to earn higher than normal returns. 
 
In addition it should be noted that many services and products which have natural monopoly 
characteristics form a part of a country’s infrastructure and this may give rise to distributional 
concerns (Ernst, 1994) It may be considered desirable to ensure that the utility is available to 
all members of the community at a price which they will be able to afford. Given that the cost 
of supply will often vary significantly according to the location and other circumstances of 
the customers, this is not an outcome which would necessarily emerge in a competitive, 
unregulated market. 
 
One possible solution lies in cross-subsidisation: a uniform price can be charged which enables 
the surplus of revenue from low-cost areas to finance supply in high-cost areas but this would 
seem to involve two disadvantages. First, the regulator responsible for reviewing the firm's 
prices, and hence the extent of the subsidy, will need access to data which enables him to verify 
that the subsidy is needed. Secondly, the relative transparency of the agency's price-setting 
processes may render the subsidy more visible and in consequence provoke opposition from 
low-cost consumers. Economists tend to suggest that it is preferable to charge customers 
according to cost, and fulfil the distributional aims by other means, for example, through social 
security payments (Foster, 1992). 
 
(d) Competitive Public Franchising 
An alternative method of regulating private monopolists is for the right to supply to be governed 
by a public franchise contract, which results from competitive tendering to acquire the right. The 
                                                 
5 There is a huge literature on these issues. See, especially, Kahn, 1988.   13
terms of the successful bid, particularly those affecting price and quality, then become 
conditions of the franchise which, like any other contract, governs the on-going behaviour of the 
supplier. Contract thus replaces conventional regulation as the instrument of legal control and, 
unlike regulation which typically involves resort to, or a threat of, the criminal process, it relies 
on termination or non-renewal of the franchise as the principal sanctions for inadequate 
performance. 
 
In theory, the ex ante competition for the monopoly right should force firms to supply their 
goods or services on terms which are consistent with economic efficiency and at the same time 
obviate the difficulties encountered by regulatory agencies in fixing appropriate prices 
(Demsetz, 1968). The agency will, however, still have to be confident that the financial structure 
of the firm is adequate to supply at the price bid. And there remains the problem of quality. The 
tender document must define the qualitative aspects of the service or goods supplied and the 
agency, in determining the outcome of the competition, should select the package of quality and 
price which, in its view, will best meet consumer preferences. That is not an easy task. Further, 
given the problems of defining and monitoring quality, there will be an incentive on the 
successful firm subsequently to reduce its costs by skimping on quality. 
 
REGULATORY STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 
All regulatory systems require a number of tasks to be performed: as an exercise of policy-
making, the goals of a regime must be established; those goals must then be translated into the 
principles and rules which control behaviour; and there must be procedures for explicating and 
enforcing the principles and rules and for the adjudication of disputes arising from them. 
Important structural issues arise in determining how these tasks are to be allocated to different 
institutions. The determination of an appropriate allocation of power contains dimensions both 
horizontal (the extent to which authority should be conferred on institutions other than the 
legislature or executive) and vertical (the degree of control exercised over such institutions). 
There are, in addition, key process values which assist in conferring legitimacy on the 
institutional structure and protect it from being diverted away from the public interest regulatory 
objectives; these include transparency and accountability. 
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(1) Regulatory Rule Making 
(a) Centralised or Decentralised Regulation 
Within a single jurisdiction, regulation can be more or less centralised and the same issue can be 
applied within an international context, given that within an economic of union of different 
states regulation may be harmonised (Bratton et al, 1996). For the purposes of exposition, 
assume that a federal state has different provinces. In general, regulation can supply to citizens 
different levels of protection at different prices, given that the cost of complying with regulation 
rises with its severity. If it be assumed that citizens across the federation do not have the same 
preferences, then there is a strong theoretical argument for decentralised regulation. Provincial 
lawmakers can more easily be informed about local preferences; and, should they reach 
decisions which do not meet those preferences, then citizens can move to another province 
where the package offered is more to their satisfaction. For their part, the suppliers of products 
or services subject to the regulatory controls can engage in trans-boundary trade or establish in 
countries where they are best able to satisfy consumer demand. 
 
There are, however, obvious problems with this approach. First, it assumes that citizens are well-
informed regarding the regulatory package, and alternatives available in different localities, and 
that migration is an easy option. Secondly, the regulation may have trans-boundary effects. 
Thirdly, provincial governments may come under pressure from their industries, who bear some 
of the cost, but none of the benefits, of regulation to override citizen preferences or exploit their 
lack of information. And if one province succumbs and reduces regulatory protection, the 
pressure on other provinces to do the same becomes all the greater 
 
Regulation at a federal level can, in an idealised form, solve these problems. It will also have the 
beneficial effect of reducing the amount of law as to which those engaged in market 
transactions, whether suppliers or consumers, will need to be informed. But centralisation 
generates its own set of serious problems. It has to adopt what its lawmakers perceive to be the 
common denominator among regional preferences; and what emerges may in fact meet the 
preferences of only a small proportion of the greater population. Moreover, the very process of 
searching for the common denominator gives rise to problems of strategic behaviour between 
decision-makers and agreement will be difficult to obtain. 
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The above analysis suggests that neither exclusive decentralised regulation nor exclusive 
centralised regulation will be satisfactory. Some compromise between the two extremes is 
therefore called for. There should be a tendency to adopt harmonised federal regulation in areas 
marked to a significant degree by the following features: a homogeneity of preferences across 
the federation; serious transboundary effects; a strong likelihood, as a result notably of 
information problems, for provinces to engage in a race to the bottom. Where these features are 
not so significant, regulatory rule-making should be left at the provincial level. 
 
(b) Differentiation in Rule-Making 
There is a spectrum representing different degrees of generality of rule formulation. At one end 
of the spectrum, regulators may create a highly precise, perhaps quantitative, rule (e.g. vehicles 
must be driven at a speed not exceeding 30 m.p.h. in a given area); at the other end, a general 
rule (e.g. vehicles must be driven at a "reasonable" speed in urban areas), requiring interpretation 
by both the actor and the enforcement agency. Because a precise rule eliminates discretion and 
uncertainty, it reduces the agency's administrative costs and the power that the agency has over 
the regulated firm. On the other hand, its specificity means that it is inflexible and cannot be 
accommodated to the variety of circumstances to which it must be applied. It is likely to be over-
inclusive (deterring more than is optimal in the circumstances) or under-inclusive (deterring less 
than is optimal in the circumstances (Ehrlich and Posner, 1974). 
 
It follows that there are various legal methods of formulating differentiated rules (Baldwin, 
1995b). The first option is to incorporate the rules into a formal regulatory code (normally 
parliamentary legislation or statutory instrument) which governs the activity. This renders the 
differentiation process more certain and more open to scrutiny, but it also makes change more 
difficult and liable to delay. The second option is for the regulatory code to contain a general 
principle, perhaps accompanied by guidelines as to how it is to be interpreted in particular 
contexts, but nevertheless conferring on the enforcement agency a broad discretion to 
differentiate according to the circumstances. Flexibility is achieved, but the exercise of 
discretion is unlikely to be open to public scrutiny and firms may be uncertain as to how the 
differentiation will apply to them. 
 
The third option is to confer power on an agency to create formal differentiated standards for 
individual firms or groups of firms. The technique normally used is a system of permits: the 
legislation prohibits the activity unless the firm obtains from the agency a permit which contains   16
conditions incorporating the appropriate differentiated standard. This option combines the 
advantages of both precise rules and discretion: the rules are well defined and thus facilitate 
enforcement and compliance; and, at the same time, they may be tailored to the circumstances of 
each case. On the other hand, the system is, of course, very costly to operate - standards being 
individually negotiated - and, unless details of the permits are available for public scrutiny, 
vulnerable to manipulation and abuse. 
 
(2) Delegated and Self-Regulation 
As we have just seen, legislation, often only lays down general principles, delegating the power 
to make more detailed rules to other institutions. An important policy issue is whether such 
institutions should be government bureaucrats or rather specialised agencies, to some degree 
independent of government, perhaps even an agency representing those who are regulated 
 
(a) Branch of Government or Independent Agency 
Expertise can be concentrated and accumulated in specialised agencies in a way which is not 
always possible with government bureaucracies; and if the agency is also responsible for 
enforcement, that experience can beneficially feed back into the rule-making process. Further, 
distance from government may reduce the dangers of political interference, encourage a longer-
term perspective and (perhaps) facilitate consultation and more open decision-making (Baldwin, 
1995b). 
 
Politicians may face the dilemma of having to placate powerful pressure groups with conflicting 
demands. They may recognise that a particular regulatory policy will benefit one group and 
impose costs on the other. A statute containing a vague principle may gain them the support of 
the first group, without incurring substantial opposition from the second group. The costs to the 
latter will become more apparent when the detailed rules are formulated; but, if this task is 
delegated to an agency, that institution, rather than the politicians, will bear the brunt of the 
criticism. Such a strategy will, moreover, be favoured by powerful pressure groups if they are 
confident that they can "capture" the agency for their own ends. 
   17
(c) Self-Regulation 
There is a long tradition that the rights of practice, and the rules of conduct, for professional 
occupations are determined by bodies drawn exclusively or predominantly from members of the 
profession and in recent times forms of self-regulation have extended into other areas. 
 
There are a number of arguments which suggest that, at least when applied to professional 
regulation, a self-regulatory agency (hereafter SRA) may be a cheaper and more effective rule-
maker than a public, independent agency (Ogus, 1995). First, since SRAs can normally 
command a greater degree of expertise and technical knowledge of practices and innovatory 
possibilities within the relevant area than independent agencies, information costs for the 
formulation and interpretation of standards are lower. Secondly, for the same reasons, 
monitoring and enforcement costs are also reduced, as are the costs to practitioners of dealing 
with regulators, given that such interaction is likely to be fostered by mutual trust. Thirdly, to the 
extent that the processes of, and rules issued by, SRAs are less formalised than those of public 
regulatory regimes, there are savings in the costs of amending standards. 
 
Of course, there are obvious objections notably that of the acquisition of power by groups 
which are not accountable to the body politic through the conventional constitutional channels. 
The capacity of an SRA to make rules governing the activities of an association or profession 
may itself constitute an abuse if it lacks democratic legitimacy in relation to members of the 
association or profession. The potential for abuse becomes intolerable if, and to the extent that, 
the rules affect third parties. And what guarantee is there that the regime will be devised and 
applied in the public interest, rather than that of the regulated group? 
 
Recent developments have allowed for some mixture of “public” and “self” regulation, thus 
benefiting from the advantages of both systems. SRAs regulate with some oversight or 
ratification by government, or officials representing the public interest. In another version 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) a public agency negotiates with individual firms regulations that 
are particularised to each firm, with the threat of an imposition of less tailored standards if it fails 
to cooperate. The administrative costs of such a system must be high, suggesting that, for such a 
regime to be cost-effective, the firm must be large and the activity to be regulated must be one in 
which efficiency requires significantly differentiated standards. 
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(3) Accountability 
We may usefully distinguish between three different forms of accountability (Loughlin, 1986). 
First, there is financial accountability: regulators should satisfy certain standards of financial 
management; they should minimise administrative costs and not waste resources. Secondly, 
their procedures must be fair and impartial (procedural accountability), such that there is an 
appropriate framework for making rules and decisions which serve the public interest and for 
resisting the undue influence of private interests.  The third form, substantive accountability, is 
the most ambitious.  It seeks to ensure that the rules and decisions are themselves justifiable in 
terms of the public interest goals of the regulatory system in question 
 
(a) Financial Accountability 
This aspect is almost self-evident and most countries have systems of public audit designed to 
ensure that public authorities and officials operate within their budget and spend resources 
only for authorised purposes. 
 
(b) Procedural Accountability 
Procedural accountability can be secured by the principles of administrative law which are 
commonly grouped under the heading of "due process" (Mashaw, 1985). Where regulators make 
decisions affecting individual persons or firms, such as the issuing of licences, they are usually 
subject to the natural justice requirement of a fair hearing. This requirement can be extended to 
other forms of regulatory rule-making, so that, for example, the regulators are bound to consult 
outside interests and to publish their proposals. Some are obliged to give reasons for their 
decisions. 
 
Such procedures, it is often argued (e.g. Birkinshaw, 1996), encourage administrative rationality 
and thus lead to better rules, in the sense of facilitating adherence to public interest goals and 
constraining diversion to private interests. But it should it not be forgotten that “open” 
procedures generate substantial administrative costs and sometimes delays. They might serve to 
reduce inequalities in the power of pressure groups but, the closer the rule-making procedures 
are to adjudication, the more likely it is that the decision-makers will strive for outcomes which 
constitute a compromise between competing special interests that are represented in the 
proceedings; and that may force them to lose sight of a broader conception of the public interest. 
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(c) Substantive Accountability 
There is, of course, no easy way of ensuring that regulation as promulgated fulfils, or at least 
pursues, its public interest goals. Certainly scrutiny by legislatures is unlikely to be effective. 
But experiments have been made with other devices, of which perhaps the most interesting is 
the regulatory impact analysis. Regulatory agencies, when preparing their rules, are in some 
countries required to issue a statement of the projected costs and benefits which the measure 
is likely to generate. This should at least impose some discipline on public officials to take 
account of the economic consequences of what they are doing (Froud et al. 1998) 
 
Judicial review – the power of the independent judiciary to review the activities of public 
authorities – constitutes an important but also controversial instrument of accountability 
(Horwitz, 1977). Judges are well-equipped to assume the tasks imposed by procedural 
accountability. On the face of it, judges might also seem to be appropriate for monitoring 
substantive accountability. Their independence and autonomy, as well as the rules of the judicial 
process, should mean that they are insulated from political pressures to a greater degree than 
regulatory agencies. On the other hand, if the gates of review are opened too widely, the 
administrative costs of regulation may escalate and private interests will have an incentive to 
exploit the process for tactical purposes, thereby frustrating the implementation of public interest 
goals. Moreover, courts do not possess the expertise normally associated with regulators and the 
adversarial setting of the judicial process does not always lend itself to grappling with the range 
of problems encountered. (Fuller, 1978) 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 
In this paper I have sought to identify the main characteristics of “competent legal and 
regulatory institutions … and sensible regulation”, such as are deemed by the Enterprise 
Development Department to be necessary to promote enterprise. In relation to particular 
developing countries, the research issues can be derived from these characteristics and 
summarised as follows. 
 
•   Regulatory regimes applying to specific sectors 
-  what are the justifications (economic or non-economic) for the regulation? 
-  Is there a failure of the market and private law to reach the desired outcomes? 
-  Are the legal forms used appropriate in the sense of being cost-effective and well-
targeted?   20
 
•   Regulatory regimes generally 
-  Is there an appropriate degree of decentralisation and differentiation in 
regulatory rule-making? 
-  Is regulatory administration delegated to appropriate institutions? 
-  Are there appropriate systems of accountability?   21
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